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The Logic of Peace
Jonathan Schell

Jonathan Schell’s The Unconquerable World points the way out of the devastation of the twentieth century toward another, more peaceful path. And his investigations into the great nonviolent events of modern times — from Gandhi’s
independence movement in India to the explosion of civic activity that brought
about the surprising collapse of the Soviet Union — suggest foundations of an
entirely new kind on which to construct an enduring peace. As Schell makes
clear, all-out war, with its risk of human extinction, must cease to play the role
of final arbiter. “The Logic of Peace,” printed here, is the final chapter of
Schell’s book.

T

he escalation of violence around the world has been so rapid since September
11, 2001, that this day may appear already to have been the August 1914 of the
twenty-first century. The parallels are striking. In 2001 as in 1914 a period of
political liberalization, economic globalization, and peace (at least in the privileged
zones of the planet) was summarily ended by a violent explosion. The fundamental
decision now, as it was then, is between force and peaceful means as the path to
safety, and the world has seemed to make a decision for force. Again, observers
have been compelled, as Henry James was in 1914, to recognize that the immediate
past has been a time of illusion — a time when the world was heading toward a
precipice but did not know it, or did not care to know it. Again, an unpredictable
chain of violent events has been set in motion — some today have even said that a
“third world war” is upon us.
And yet, since history does not repeat itself, the analogy between 1914 and
2001, like all measurements of the present with yardsticks from the past, is useful
only for querying events, not for predicting them. There are equally important differences between the two moments, some of them obvious, others less so. In 1914,
the great powers’ preparations for war were complete. The arms were piled high,
the troops massed, the war plans mapped out in detail, the mobilization schedules
fixed, the treaties of alliance signed and sealed. Even before the first shot was fired,
the whole of the long war to come lay waiting in the file cabinets of the chanceries
of Europe, needing only the right incident to spring to life. And when that incident
came and the armies were hurled across the borders, no power on earth, including
the governments involved, could call them back until the war had run its full bloody
course. Our moment, by contrast, is one of exceptional unpredictability and fluidity.
No inexorable timetables or web of alliances among great powers threaten to drag
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everyone together into a new abyss. The unexpected — new crises, abrupt developments, sudden opportunities — is the order of the day. The strength of the forces
that attacked on September 11 is unclear, and appears likely to wax or wane in
response to events. The Bush administration has announced a series of wars that it
may decide to fight, but there will be points of decision at every step along the way.
Developments in the field can quickly alter political opinion at home. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can inhibit as well as provoke war. Elections
can bring new people to power. Other countries are watching and waiting, uncertain
where and how to bring the weight of their influence to bear. The effect of a series
of wars, if such occur, on global economic integration is unknown, and huge uncertainties shadow the economic scene.
As shocking as September 11 was, it was not a decisive catastrophe, but rather a
warning. No irrevocable decision has in fact been made. The scope for choice
remains unusually large, and the new cycle of violence can still be broken or
reversed, and new policies adopted. Seen narrowly, September 11 posed the specific
question of how the United States and the civilized world should deal with a global
terrorist network ready to commit any crime within its power. That question
requires all the urgent attention and action that it is receiving. A the same time, I
submit, we should be asking what the larger and more fundamental decisions for
policy may be. If we take this broader approach, the profound changes that have
occurred in the character of violence, politics, and power over the last century will
command our attention. In 1918 and 1945, a decision in favor of coercive power
clearly meant in practice choosing the old war system, and a decision in favor of
cooperative power meant choosing to create ex nihilo a Wilsonian system of global
collective security based on international law. Today, neither of these alternatives is
open to us. Others are on the table. Let us consider each of the two paths, beginning
with the choice of coercive power, then turning to the choice of cooperative power.
Violence as the Solution to Violence:
The End of Balance
Now as in 1918 and 1945, organized violence plays a double role in the decision,
for violence is both the problem to be solved and one of the solutions on offer — a
solution to itself. This remedy is of course as old as history. When Clemenceau
rejected Wilson’s vision in favor of an old system in which he still had “faith,” he
was referring to definite plans for defending his country within the framework of
the global war system. And when the diplomat Harold Nicolson began to lose confidence in Wilsonism and repaired to that old system because the value of “armaments, strategic frontiers, alliances” was already proven, he was reverting to the
same faith. Both held to the idea, codified in the realist school of political thought,
of creating a balance of power, which had always been the main hope for peace of
those who planned to deploy the instruments of violence to prevent violence. When
nuclear weapons were invented, war among the great powers became unworkable,
yet the idea of balance survived, in the new form of the balance of terror. Some
have continued to call the balance of terror a balance of power, but a better term
might be a balance of powerlessness, inasmuch as its stability rests on the willingness of the parties to enlist in a community of total jeopardy.
The balance of powerlessness may have been more effective than the balance of
power exactly because the penalty for failure, nuclear annihilation, was so much
greater. It cannot, of course, be demonstrated conclusively that nuclear terror pre276

vented a third world war. Too many ifs of history are involved to make a firm judgment. (Since we cannot in the present predict what history will do, what makes us
think that we can say what history would have done if such and such an imaginary
event had occurred?) For example, we would have to determine that a third world
war had been straining to occur — only to be checked by fear of the bomb. We
would also have to show that the presence of nuclear weapons did more to prevent
world war than to cause it. After all, the most acute crisis of the Cold War, the Cuban missile crisis, was brought about by the deployment of nuclear weapons. If
nuclear strategic thinking had anything to do with resolving that crisis (something
that is in itself difficult to demonstrate), it was only after causing the crisis in the
first place.
Nevertheless, it is as possible as it is necessary, even without resolving these unanswerable questions, to acknowledge that the presence of the bomb weighed
heavily in the calculations of the statesmen of the Cold War, inclining them against
major war each time a crisis occurred. Their increasing recognition that, as President
Ronald Reagan put it, “nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought” was a
central fact, in theory and in practice, of the Cold War.
With these developments, nuclear strategy acquired a Wilsonian dimension. It had
evolved into a war stopper. The importance of the role of the balance of terror as a
peacekeeper becomes clearer if we consider the varying fates of the century’s two
major organizations for peacekeeping, the League of Nations and the United
Nations. The League was discredited by a series of aggressions and conflicts it was
unable to prevent or halt, then swept aside by the Second World War. The Cold War
played a similar role in sidelining the United Nations.
President Franklin Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, who first called for such an
organization in the Atlantic Charter in 1941, had sought to draw lessons from the
fate of the League. Instead of assigning the peacekeeping function to a large council,
as the League did, they vested it in an alliance of the prospective victors of the
Second World War — the United States, the Soviet Union, China, England, and
France — each of whom was given a permanent seat on the Security Council and a
veto over its decisions. The hope was that this small, tight-knit group of great powers could guarantee the peace more effectively than the multitude of nations charged
with that responsibility under the provisions of the League. But almost immediately
after the organization’s foundation in 1946, this arrangement was for all intents and
purposes nullified by the advent of the Cold War. In 1950, the Korean War, sanctioned by the Security Council after the Soviet Union walked out of its proceedings,
confirmed that the breakdown in relations between the United States and the Soviet
Union was irreparable.
If this geopolitical split had been the only reason for the UN’s failure to perform
its central role, the story would be a familiar one, well-known to analysts of the
League’s collapse: collective security fails to get off the ground because the powers
that are supposed to enforce it fall out with one another. The designated peacemakers become the peace-breakers, and no one else is strong enough to bring them into
line. In fact, however, the UN’s marginalization occurred for another reason as well
— the onset of the nuclear age. By an accident of historical timing, the bomb was
first tested and dropped in the hiatus between the designing of the United Nations
and its founding.
In April of 1945, in San Francisco, the Conference on International Organization
formally agreed on the outlines of the UN Charter. On October 24, the UN came
into existence. On August 6, however, the destruction of Hiroshima radically trans277
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formed the nature of the main problem, great-power war, that the new organization
had been fashioned to solve. Conceived in one age, the UN was born in another.
Having been designed to cope with a world dominated by the global war system, it
came into existence after that system’s death knell had been sounded. The central
purpose of the UN was to prevent a third world war — to, in the words of the Preamble to its Charter, “save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which
twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind.” But as the years passed
it was not to the UN, disabled by the Cold War, that the great powers turned to save
them from a third world war but to nuclear arsenals. Even as the Cold War was
wrecking the UN as an instrument for keeping the peace, nuclear deterrence was
coopting it. Thus the UN was not swept away, as the League had been by approaching world war; it was permitted to live on to perform important, if secondary services — supplying humanitarian relief in disasters of every description, sending
peacekeeping forces to calm local conflicts, providing a forum for the expression of
international opinion.
With the end of the bipolar Cold War order, and the acceleration of nuclear proliferation, however, the new, nuclearized form the balance is crumbling. For reasons
both political and technical, nuclear terror is rapidly shedding its “Wilsonian” role as
a preserver of stability and peace.
Some, it is true, have argued to the contrary that the balance of nuclear terror can
actually be extended and strengthened by proliferation. Just as nuclear weapons
stopped the two superpowers of the Cold War from fighting a hot war, so, it is suggested, they can immobilize ten or twenty or thirty nuclear powers, in a grand peace
based on universal terror. The political scientist Kenneth Waltz, for example, has
suggested that “the gradual spread of nuclear weapons is more to be welcomed than
feared.”1 He hopes that the Soviet-American stalemate enforced by deterrence during
the Cold War might be enlarged to include many more nations. What has not been
explained, however, is how a steadily growing number of nuclear powers, each capable of annihilating some or all of the others, can balance their forces in a way that
would leave any of them feeling safe. Mutual assured destruction is a policy whose
logic fits a bipolar relationship. It defies adjustment to a multi-nuclear-power world.
Proliferation, indeed, undermines stability in every sense of that word. In the first
place, it destroys strategic stability. Strategic balance during the Cold War was supposed to depend on the attempt to maintain a rough equality between the forces of
the two sides; but in a world of many nuclear powers this goal would be unreachable. If Country A and Country B were to painstakingly craft a stable nuclear balance (something, incidentally, that the Soviet Union and the United States failed to
do for as long as the Cold War continued), it could be overthrown instantly by any
nuclear-armed Country C that suddenly allied itself with one or the other. The necessary changes in targeting could be accomplished in just a few hours or days. Even
in today’s world of eight nuclear powers (or perhaps nine, if North Korea’s claim to
possess nuclear weapons is true), some of the imbalances inherent in nuclear multipolarity are evident. There is little hope of balance, for example, in the quadrilateral
relationship of the United States, China, India, and Pakistan. India has stated that it
became a nuclear power to balance nuclear-armed China, by whom it was defeated
in a conventional border war in 1962. Pakistan became a nuclear power to balance
India. If India seeks again to balance China, however, will Pakistan seek to keep up?
China, moreover, has supplied nuclear technology to Pakistan. And Pakistan has
supplied some to North Korea, receiving missile technology in return. Will India
therefore feel compelled to build a nuclear arsenal that equals both China’s and
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Pakistan’s? The United States meanwhile has decided to build national missile
defenses, which, if they turn out to work, will erode or nullify China’s capacity to
strike the United States. China has already said that it will respond by building up its
still modest nuclear forces. That will put additional pressure on India. Nor can we
forget that Russia may, at any point, step into the picture with its still-huge arsenal.
The spread of ballistic- and cruise-missile technology, whose proliferation is as predictable as that of nuclear technology, compounds the problem geometrically.
In the second place, proliferation is bound to undermine the foundations of technical stability. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union sought a
kind of safety in the policy of mutual assured destruction. In practice, however, they
found that their nuclear command-and-control systems were so vulnerable to a first
strike that the retaliation required by the doctrine could not in fact be assured. To
cure the problem, the two governments resorted to policies of “launch on warning”
— that is, each planned to launch its retaliatory strike after receiving a warning that
the other side had launched its first strike but before the missiles had arrived. This
system placed severe time pressure on any decision to launch in retaliation, increasing the risks of accidental war. The presidents of the two nations were — and still
are —required to make these decisions within five minutes of receiving warning of
an incoming strike. The pressures on Russia, which now faces a technically superior
American force, have grown especially severe.
If the United States and Russia, with all their resources and an ocean between
them, cannot guarantee the survival of their command-and-control systems, is it
reasonable to expect that smaller, poorer nations, facing many potential adversaries,
with little or no warning time, will accomplish this? The warning time between
India and Pakistan, for instance, is effectively zero. For them, not even launch on
warning is possible. The requirements for nuclear stability under the doctrine of
deterrence are thus altogether lacking.
In the third place, what the experts call arms-control stability — meaning conditions favorable to negotiated limits on or reductions of nuclear arsenals — would be
destroyed. During the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union, unable to
agree on numerical offensive limits, built up their collective arsenals to the preposterous collective level of some seventy-five thousand nuclear warheads. In a multipolar nuclear world, arms-control agreements would become exponentially harder to
achieve. How could twenty or thirty nations, few of whom trusted the others or
were sure what they were doing, be able to adjust the scores of nuclear balances
among them? Containing proliferation (if someone should wish to return to that
policy somewhere down the road) would be a pipe dream. How would, say, the
twentieth nuclear power persuade the twenty-first that building nuclear weapons is a
bad idea?
In the fourth place, multiplying nuclear arsenals would increase the danger of
nuclear terrorism. A world of proliferation would be a world awash in nuclear
materials. Terrorists who acquired them would be indifferent to nuclear threats from
others. The balance of terror depends on fear of retaliatory annihilation, but many
terrorists have no country of whose annihilation they are afraid. They are unafraid
to lose even their own lives, and blow themselves up with the bombs they aim at
others. The terrorist bent on self-immolation with a weapon of mass destruction is
the nemesis of balance. Deterrence has no purchase on the dead.
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Violence as the Solution to Violence:
Empire
If the balance of power and the balance of terror are no longer available, does the
storehouse of systems of coercive power still offer any resource for keeping peace in
the world? One option remains to be considered: universal empire, substantially
achieved only once in the history of the Western world, by the Romans. (Even they
were unable to conquer certain outlying territories.) The nation now aspiring to a
global imperial role is, of course, the United States. Its military dominance is one
more reason that a balance of power has become impracticable. Obviously, there can
be no balance when one power is mightier than all the others put together. Not a
balance of power but a monopoly of power — or, at any rate, of force — is the
present American ambition. The new state of affairs is sometimes referred to as
“unipolarity,” but the term is an oxymoron within a single word, for by definition
“polarity” requires two poles. (The Bush administration’s official statement of its
global policy, the “National Security Strategy,” falls into a similar confusion when it
speaks of a “balance of power in favor of freedom.” A balance that is “in favor of”
one side is again by definition not a balance.)
Although both the balance-of-power system and the balance of terror were
primarily based on coercion, both contained significant admixtures of cooperation.
Both depended on a sort of brute equity among two or more powers. If the balance
was to be maintained, neither could claim a right to attack the other: they must
coexist. Under the balance of terror, the element of cooperation was even stronger.
The two sides were bonded in the common project of avoiding the war that would
annihilate both. They were paradoxical partners in survival. A global hegemonic
peace, on the other hand, would mark the triumph of coercion. Its foundation would
be not equality of any kind but the absolute and unchallengeable superiority of one
power and the vassalage of others — not mutual nonaggression but preemption, not
coexistence but the right of one, and only one, to execute “regime change.”
The idea of American global hegemony thus carries the rule of force to an
extreme. And yet, fantastic and unreal as the ambition may be, there is a logic underlying it. Means, this logic runs, must be adequate to ends. Since proliferation is
in its nature global so must American domination. The United States will employ its
overwhelming military superiority to stop proliferation all around the world. It
applies to the world the reasoning that Bodin applied to the state four hundred years
ago: the world is now a community; a community needs order; to provide order
there must be a sovereign; the sovereign can be none other than the master of the
sword; the United States alone can lay a claim to mastering the sword; therefore the
United States must be the global sovereign. And so on behalf of its own and the
world’s safety, the United States will fight a series of what can be called
disarmament wars. Under this plan the United States would, indeed, become a
“disarmament empire,” dedicated to preserving the world from nuclear destruction.
(Of course, all empires are in a sense disarmament empires: they rule by defeating
— by destroying or disarming — every foe and rival.) It is not going too far to say
that if the solutions to the danger of nuclear proliferation were restricted to coercive
systems, then some form of imperial domination would be the form it would have to
take.
To acknowledge the existence of this logic, which lends the American bid for
hegemony whatever legitimacy it has, is not to overlook the more mundane and
sordid aspects of American imperial ambition. Every empire in history has con280

cealed coarse self-interest behind a veil of noble ideals, and there is no reason to
believe that American imperialism would be an exception. The most obvious and the
rawest of these motivations is the wish to take control of the oil reserves of Central
Asia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Far more sweeping is the assertion in the
“National Security Strategy” that in all the world there is now “a single sustainable
model for national success”: the American one of “freedom, democracy, and free
enterprise.” It is a formulation that, when wedded to the assertion of unchallengeable
American military superiority and the right to intervene militarily anywhere on
earth, plainly sets the stage for attempts to impose America’s will on nations in
almost any area of their collective existence.
A plan for global hegemony, however, has not suddenly become feasible simply
because the balance of power and the balance of terror no longer work. Even if we
supposed that the United States were to complete the transition from republic to
empire, there are powerful reasons to believe that it would fail to realize its global
ambitions, whether idealistic or self-interested. Any imperial plan in the twenty-first
century tilts against what have so far proved to be the two most powerful forces of
the modern age: the spread of scientific knowledge and the resolve of peoples to
reject foreign rule and take charge of their own destinies. If the history of the past
two centuries is a guide, neither can be bombed out of existence.
The most persuasive rationale for empire is its promise of deliverance from the
threat of weapons of mass destruction. The views of most countries on this subject,
however, are far different from those of the United States. The Bush administration
looks out upon the world and sees “evildoers” trying to procure terrible weapons;
the world looks back and sees a hypocritical power seeking to deny to others what it
possesses in abundance and even plans to use preemptively. Most countries fear those
who already have nuclear weapons at least as much as they fear those who are
merely trying to get them. In their view, stopping proliferation deals at best with a
secondary aspect of the nuclear problem. They still see what has perhaps become
invisible to American eyes — that the United States and Russia have thousands of
nuclear weapons pointed at one another and at others and have refused to surrender
these arsenals. They also see that the club of possessors has grown to include South
Asia, where the danger of nuclear war has become acute, and they note that no plan
is on the drawing board to denuclearize these powers, either. On the contrary,
nuclearization has been a ticket into the good graces of the United States for both
countries. Finally, they observe that the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, under
which a hundred and eighty-two countries have agreed to forgo nuclear arms, is in
jeopardy of breaking down because the five nations that possess nuclear arsenals
under the terms of the treaty show no sign of fulfilling their pledge under its Article
6 to eliminate them. (Three other nuclear powers — India, Pakistan, and Israel —
are nonmembers of the treaty, and the fourth, North Korea, has announced its intention of withdrawing.) It was in defiance of this nuclear double standard that India
set off its nuclear tests in 1998, prompting Pakistan’s responding tests. Was “regime
change” an option in these cases? Is it in North Korea? Will it be if Iran, Egypt,
Syria, or, for that matter, Japan or Germany builds a nuclear arsenal? Does the
United States propose to overthrow the government of every country that, rebelling
against the attempt to institutionalize the double standard, seeks to acquire weapons
of mass destruction? The attempt indeed appears more likely to provoke than prevent proliferation, as has already happened in North Korea. Nations threatened with
that nightmare of the ages, a great power seeking global domination, will go to
desperate lengths to redress the balance. Weapons of mass destruction are an obvious
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means.
What is true for proliferation of nuclear weapons is also likely to be true for their
use. Force, history teaches, summons counterforce. What goes around comes
around. The United States is the only nation on earth that has used these weapons of
mass destruction. An American attempt to dominate world affairs is a recipe for
provoking their use again, very possibly on American soil.
It’s unlikely that the passion for self-determination will be any easier to suppress
than the spread of destructive technology. Empire, the supreme embodiment of
force, is the antithesis of self-determination. It violates equity on a global scale. No
lover of freedom can give it support. It is especially contrary to the founding principles of the United States, whose domestic institutions are incompatible with the
maintenance of empire. Historically, imperial rule has rested on three kinds of supremacy — military, economic, and political. The United States enjoys unequivocal
superiority in only one of these domains — the military, and here only in the conventional sphere. (Any attempt at regime change in a country equipped with even a
modest deliverable nuclear arsenal is out of the question even for the United States.)
American economic power is impressive, yet in this domain it has several equals or
near equals, including the European Union and Japan, who are not likely to bend
easily to American will. In the political arena the United States is weak. “Covenants,
without the sword, are but words,” Hobbes said in the late seventeenth century.
Since then, the world has learned that swords without covenants are but empty
bloodshed. In the political arena, the lesson of the world revolt — that winning
military victories may sometimes be easy but building political institutions in foreign lands is hard, often impossible — still obtains. The nation so keenly interested
in regime change has small interest in nation-building and less capacity to carry it
out. The United States, indeed, is especially mistrusted, often hated, around the
world. If it embarks on a plan of imperial supremacy, it will be hated still more.
Can cruise missiles build nations? Does power still flow from the barrel of a gun —
or from a Predator Drone? Can the world in the twenty-first century really be ruled
from thirty-five thousand feet? Modern peoples have the will to resist and the means
to do so. Imperialism without politics is a naive imperialism. In our time, force can
win a battle or two, but politics is destiny.
Can a nation that began its life in rebellion against the most powerful empire of
its time end by trying to become a still more powerful empire? It perhaps can, but
not if it wishes to remain a republic. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams defined
the choice with precision in 1821. After giving his country the wellknown advice
that the United States should not go abroad “in search of monsters to destroy” but be
“the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all ... the champion and vindicator only of her own,” he added that if the United States embarked on the path of
dominating others, the “fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change
from liberty to force . . . . She might become the dictatress of the world. She would
no longer be the ruler of her own spirit.”2
A country’s violence, Hannah Arendt said, can destroy its power. The United
States is moving quickly down this path. Do American leaders imagine that the
people of the world, having overthrown the territorial empires of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries, are ready to bend the knee to an American overlord in the
twenty-first? Do they imagine that allies are willing to become subordinates? Have
they forgotten that people hate to be dominated by force? History is packed with
surprises. The leaders of the totalitarian Soviet empire miraculously had the good
sense to yield up their power without unleashing the tremendous violence that was at
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their fingertips. Could it be the destiny of the American republic, unable to resist the
allure of an imperial delusion, to flare out in a blaze of pointless mass destruction
__________________________________
The Cooperative Path
In sum, the days when humanity can hope to save itself from force with force are
over. None of the structures of violence — not the balance of power, not the balance
of terror, not empire — can any longer rescue the world from the use of violence,
now grown apocalyptic. Force can lead only to more force, not to peace. Only a
turn to structures of cooperative power can offer hope. To choose that path, the
United States would, as a first order of business, have to choose the American
republic over the American empire, and then, on the basis of the principles that
underlie the republic, join with other nations to build cooperative structures as a
basis for peace.
For Americans, the choice is at once between two Americas, and between two
futures for the international order. In an imperial America, power would be concentrated in the hands of the president, and checks and balances would be at an end;
civil liberties would be weakened or lost; military spending would crowd out social
spending; the gap between rich and poor would be likely to increase; electoral politics, to the extent that they still mattered, would be increasingly dominated by
money, above all corporate money, whose influence would trump the people’s interests; the social, economic, and ecological agenda of the country and the world would
be increasingly neglected. On the other hand, in a republican America dedicated to
the creation of a cooperative world, the immense concentration of power in the
executive would be broken up; power would be divided again among the three
branches, which would resume their responsibility of checking and balancing one
another as the Constitution provides; civil liberties would remain intact or be
strengthened; money would be driven out of politics, and the will of the people
would be heard again; politics, and with it the power of the people, would revive;
the social, economic, and ecological agendas of the country and the world would
become the chief concern of the government.
Which path the United States will choose is likely to be decided in a protracted,
arduous political struggle in the years ahead. Its outcome cannot be predicted. For
the time being, the United States has chosen the coercive, imperial path, but that
decision can be reversed. Of course, no American decision alone can secure peace in
the world. It is the essence of the task that many nations must cooperate in it. If they
do, however, they will find that twentieth-century history has presented them, together with all its violence, an abundance of materials to work with. There are
grounds for optimism in the restricted but real sense that if the will to turn away
from force and toward cooperation were to develop, history has provided more
extensive and solid foundations for accomplishment than have ever existed before.
For the anatomy of cooperative power has been transformed by the events of the
past century as fully as that of coercive power.
Much that Woodrow Wilson hoped for has in fact come to pass. He wanted a
world of popular self-determination. His vision is our reality (to a fault, as the
tangled wars of self-determination of recent years demonstrate). He dreamed that the
world would be made safe for democracy. We can begin to imagine, in the wake of
the liberal democratic revival and the Western liberal settlement, that spreading
democracy will help to make the world safe. He hated the territorial empires of his
time. Today, they are on history’s scrap heap.
Hopeful developments that Wilson could not have foreseen have also occurred.
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The Wilsonian peace was destroyed in good measure by the rise of totalitarianism.
Now totalitarianism, too, lies in the dust. In Wilson’s day, revolution was widely
thought to be in its nature violent. We have witnessed the power of nonviolent revolution, which was responsible for the downfall of the greatest empires of the previous two centuries, the British and the Soviet. In his day, the global adapt-or-die war
system was at the apex of its power. In ours, it is disabled. Each of the aforementioned developments indeed curtailed that system in a different way. The military
power deployed at the top of the system ran into the buzz saw of even greater power
based on popular will at the bottom. As in Alice in Wonderland’s croquet game, in
which the mallets were flamingos and the balls were hedgehogs, the pawns in the
imperial game, mistaken for inanimate objects by the imperialists, came alive in
their hands and began, universally and unstoppably, to pursue their own plans and
ambitions. In this new dispensation, which can guarantee against global domination
far more reliably than the balance of power ever could, the wills of innumerable
local peoples play the role previously played by the resolve of major powers to go to
war to stop a global conqueror.
While the self-determination movement was encasing the giant’s feet in cement,
nuclear weapons were immobilizing his head and limbs. What need was there to
obey the dictates of the war system’s global logic of force when at the end of every
military path was neither victory nor defeat but a common annihilation? Coexistence
had always been a wise policy; now it became a necessity. It remains so — American
conventional military superiority notwithstanding — for all nuclear-capable powers.
Even tiny, impoverished North Korea can deter the United States and all its might if
it possesses half a dozen nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them. Of course,
it is still quite possible to stumble across the dread threshold, committing genocide
and suicide in a single act, but the option is hardly tempting.
Even as self-determination movements and nuclear arsenals were, in their different ways, paralyzing force as the final arbiter in global affairs, nonviolent revolution
in the Soviet bloc and elsewhere was proving the existence of a force that now could
arbitrate. Gyorgy Konrad was right, far-fetched as it may have seemed at the time,
to suggest that his “antipolitics” pointed a way out of the Cold War and the nuclear
stalemate, and so was Adam Michnik when he said that he and his colleagues had
discovered a political equivalent of the atomic bomb. Has the effectiveness of what
William James called the moral equivalent of war ever been more effectually demonstrated?
At the same time, the revival of liberal democracy was creating a growing, informal bloc of nations whose members enjoyed peaceful relations not because they
bristled with arms or had established a cumbersome structure of collective security
but merely because they lacked any reason or inclination for war and possessed
cooperative means for resolving such disagreements as did arise.
The success of the self-determination movement, the rise of nuclear capacity, the
success of nonviolent revolutions, and the liberal democratic revival are deep-rooted
historical realities. Even as (with the exception of nonviolent revolution) they have
created new dangers, they have laid down new foundations for a world that can
move away from violence as the principle arbiter of its political affairs.
Shall we, then, return to the fray with a third round of Wilsonism? Shall we attempt once more to write a constitution for the whole world? We must answer in the
negative. It would not make sense to apply twice-failed solution to problems that no
longer exist. The entrenched war system defeated Wilson, and it is perhaps the most
important of our inestimable advantages that we do not face this monster. Its fall has
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opened up new avenues for action. No longer is it necessary, as it was in his time, to
put in place a global system of law as a precondition for dismantling the structures
of force. The two tasks can proceed along separate tracks, each at its own pace. No
longer do we face the impossible task of uprooting the war system in its entirety or
leaving it in place. The all-or-nothing dilemma has dissolved. Seeing, just as Wilson
did, that by continuing to rely on systems of violence we condemn ourselves to
catastrophe and horror, we can adopt his radical goal of creating a peaceful world
while remaining at liberty to carry it out step by step. We can borrow a leaf from
the Eastern Europeans. Rejecting a choice between accommodation and violent, allor-nothing revolution, they decided upon the incremental pursuit of revolutionary
ends by peaceful, reformist means. Acting on the basis of common principles yet
without any blueprint — “in cooperation without unification,” in the phrase of the
French sociologist Pierre Bourdieu — they pooled the variegated forces of society to
achieve a radical renewal of their lives that in the end accomplished everything that
was necessary. A revolution against violence in the world at large today would, in
imitation of this process, not be the realization of any single plan drawn up by any
one person or council but would develop, like open software, as the common creation of any and all comers, acting at every political level, within as well as outside
government, on the basis of common principles.
One day, humankind may organize itself into a true body politic. Perhaps this
will be some remote variation on the United Nations, whose hand now lies so lightly
on the world; perhaps it will be some new organizational form. That day had not
come in Wilson’s time. It has not come in ours. Even as an ideal, the structure of a
global body politic remains uninvented. Such a novel object is unlikely to take a
familiar form. The need for global political structures to deal with the globalized
economy and the swiftly deteriorating global environment is manifest. Yet it would
be premature, for instance, to suppose that they should constitute a “world government” or a “world state.” The words “state” and “government” carry too much unwanted baggage from the past. Why should an organization whose purpose and surrounding context would be so different from those of national governments repeat
their structures? (The federal tradition is the most promising one perhaps, but no
existing federation provides a model.) Nation-states, for example, have been in a
condition of unceasing rivalry and conflict with one another and this condition has
shaped basic elements of their anatomies. A global body politic, by contrast, would
exist alone on earth — a circumstance that must have the profoundest consequences
for its character, if only because of the blood-chilling possibility that, if it were
endowed with anything like the powers to which existing states are accustomed, it
might become repressive, leaving no corner of the earth free. There is a raw freedom in the plurality of states that the world should not surrender easily, or without
the firmest confidence that a more civilized freedom can be defended and maintained.
In our new circumstances, the starting point of a world politics based in cooperative power would be not a blueprint for an ideal system of law but the reality that
has already emerged on the ground. It is a reality for which there is as yet no adequate name. The word, when it appears, will refer to the power of action without
violence, whether in revolution, the civil state, or the international order. I have
followed convention in referring to this thing as nonviolence, but the word is highly
imperfect for its purpose. “Nonviolence” is a word of negative construction, as if the
most important thing that could be said about nonviolent action was that it was not
something else. Yet that which it negates — violence — is already negative, a
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subtractor from life. A double negative, in mathematics, gives a positive result. And
in fact the thing itself, nonviolence, is entirely positive, as Gandhi said. Yet in English there is no positive word for it. It’s as if we were obliged to refer to action as
“non-inaction,” to hope as “non-hopelessness,” or to faith as “non-unbelief.” It was
in search of a solution to this problem that Gandhi coined his untranslatable
“satyagraha.” Havel spoke, only somewhat less mysteriously, of “living in truth.”
Arendt sought to wrest the word “power” from its normal usage and turn it to this
end. John Adams and Thomas Jefferson who differed about many things — spoke of
the power of citizens that flowed from the disposition of their hearts and minds, and
recognized that such action was the foundation of all systems of political freedom. I
have resorted in these pages to the plain phrase “cooperative power,” as distinct from
“coercive power.”
The agenda of a program to build a cooperative world would be to choose and
foster cooperative means at every level of political life. At the street level, this
would mean choosing satyagraha over violent insurrection — the sit-down or general strike or “social work” over the suicide bombing or the attack on the local
broadcasting station. At the level of the state it would mean choosing democracy
over authoritarianism or totalitarianism (although some, such as Jefferson, Arendt,
and Gandhi, have hoped for the invention of a political system that would provide
more participation for citizens than representative democracy does); at the level of
international affairs, it would mean choosing negotiation, treaties, and other agreements and institutions over war and, in general, choosing a cooperative, multilateral
international system over an imperial one; at the level of biological survival, it
would mean choosing nuclear disarmament over the balance of nuclear terror and
proliferation. There is no reason to restrict the idea of cooperative power to individuals acting together. We can, to paraphrase Burke, just as well say, “freedom,
when nations act in concert, is power.” The choice at each level is never merely the
rejection of violence; it is always at the same time the embrace of its cooperative
equivalent.
Such a program of action, though lacking the explicit, technical coherence of a
blueprint, would possess the inherent moral and practical coherence of any set of
actions taken on the basis of common principles. History shows that violence incites
more violence, without respect for national borders or the boundaries that supposedly divide foreign from domestic affairs. All forms of terror, from the suicide
bombing in the pizza parlor to the torture in the basement to the globe-spanning
balance of terror, foster one another. Nonviolence is likewise synergistic and contagious. For just as there is a logic of force, there is a logic of peace — a “cycle of
nonviolence.” Just as violent revolution creates the conditions for dictatorship, nonviolent revolution paves the way for democracy. Just as dictatorships incline toward
war, democracies, if they can resist imperial temptations, incline toward peace with
one another. Just as war is the natural environment for repression and dominance by
the privileged few, peace is the natural environment for human rights and justice for
the poor. Consider, for example, the ramifications of the peaceful rebellion against
Soviet rule. It was met, as a violent revolution surely would not have been, with
Gorbachev’s nonviolent, reformist response, which led, however unintentionally, to
the end of the Soviet regime, which in turn created the conditions for peace between
the Cold War powers. And recall, by contrast, the outbreak of the First World War.
It led to the rise of totalitarianism, which led to the Second World War, which led in
turn to the advent of the Cold War and the species-threatening nuclear balance of
terror. No one planned or could have foreseen these chains of consequences but they
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were as sure and real as anything anyone did plan.
A revolution against violence — loosely coordinated, multiform, flexible, based
on common principles and a common goal rather than on a common blueprint —
would encompass a multitude of specific plans, including ones for disarmament,
conventional as well as nuclear; democratization and human rights; advancement of
international law; reform of the United Nations; local and regional peacekeeping and
peacemaking; and social and ecological programs that form the indispensable content of a program of nonviolent change. To neglect the last of these would be to
neglect the lesson that campaigns of noncooperation are empty without constructive
programs. Justice for the poor (victims of “structural violence”) and rescue of the
abused environment of the earth (victim of human violence done to other living
creatures) are indispensable goals. They are already served by a rich new array of
nongovernmental organizations and movements, constituting the beginnings of an
international civil society. They range from local protest and rebellion by the poor
against their exploitation, through movements of protest in rich countries against
undemocratic and anti-environmental trade agreements, through nongovernmental
organizations, and philanthropic organizations, both secular and religious, dedicated
to human rights, the alleviation of poverty, and other causes, to former statesmen
still eager to be of public service in the cause of peace (the former Soviet president
Mikhail Gorbachev, the former American president Jimmy Carter, and the former
president of Costa Rica, Oscar Arias, are notable examples).
Of equal or greater importance is the feminist revolution, itself a part of the
much broader democratic revolution of modern times. The public world has hitherto
been run by males, and it is clear that, whatever their virtues and vices, their way of
doing things has reached an impasse. Experts can dispute whether the unmistakable
male proclivity for war is innate or learned, the product of nature or nurture, but
one thing we cannot doubt is that historically organized violence has been bound up
with the male way of being human — with men’s needs, men’s desires, and men’s
interests. It is no less clear that historically the pursuits of women have been more
peaceful. Could it be that nature in her wisdom created two genders in order to have
a “second sex” in reserve, so to speak, for just such an emergency as the one we now
face? There may be a less violent way of doing things that is rooted in female tradition and now will move to the fore, together with the gender that created it.
Peace begins, someone has said, when the hungry are fed. It is equally true that
feeding the hungry begins when peace comes. Global warming cannot be stopped by
B-52s any more than nuclear proliferation can; only cooperation in the form of
binding treaties can accomplish either task. Peace, social justice, and defense of the
environment are a cooperative triad to pit against the coercive, imperial triad of war,
economic exploitation, and environmental degradation. Lovers of freedom, lovers of
social justice, disarmers, peacekeepers, civil disobeyers, democrats, civil-rights activists, and defenders of the environment are legions in a single multiform cause,
and they will gain strength by knowing it, taking encouragement from it, and, when
appropriate and opportune, pooling their efforts.
Among the innumerable possible specific plans that such a program could entail,
I have picked four to discuss here — not because they are in any way comprehensive, or even, in every case, necessarily the most important ones that can be imagined, but because they all bear directly on the choice between cooperation and coercion, and seem to me to be timely, realistic, and illustrative of the unity in diversity
that a broad choice in favor of cooperation would manifest. They are a worldwide
treaty to abolish nuclear arms and other weapons of mass destruction; a program of
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international intervention to ameliorate, contain, or end wars of self-determination
on the basis of a reformed conception of national sovereignty; enforcement of a
prohibition against crimes against humanity; and the foundation of a democratic
league to lend support to democracy worldwide as an underpinning of peace and to
restrain existing democracies from betraying their principles in their foreign policies.
A Decision to Exist
In Wilson’s day, rejecting violence meant rejecting war — above all, world war. In
our time, we must secure not only peace but survival. The menace of annihilation —
of cities, of nations, of the species — arguably suppressed the menace of world war,
and now we must suppress the menace of annihilation. A decision for nonviolence,
in our time, is a decision to exist.
An agreement to abolish nuclear arms and all other weapons of mass destruction
is the sine qua non of any sane or workable international system in the twenty-first
century. Any other attempted settlement of the issue of weapons of mass destruction
will clash with other efforts to bring peace, with common sense, and with elementary decency. No tolerable policy can be founded upon the permanent institutionalization of a capacity and intention to kill millions of innocent people. No humane
international order can depend upon a threat to extinguish humanity. Abolition alone
provides a sound basis for the continued deepening and spread of liberal democracy,
whose founding principles are violated and affronted by the maintenance of nuclear
terror: “a democracy based on terror” is, in the long run, a contradiction in terms.
And abolition alone can, by ending the nuclear double standard, stop proliferation
and make effective the existing bans on other weapons of mass destruction. The
logic of abolition is the real alternative to the logic of empire.
In practice, abolition means that the eight or nine nations that now possess
nuclear weapons must join the hundred and eighty-two that have renounced them
under the terms of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. (The four nations — Israel,
India, Pakistan, and Cuba — that have declined to join the treaty must do so.) The
signatories may also wish to convert the treaty into a Nuclear Weapons Convention,
which would take its place alongside the existing conventions banning biological
weapons and chemical weapons. At that point, the signatories might wish to merge
these three conventions into one, banning all weapons of mass destruction, including
any that might be invented in the future. The step would be logical and practical,
inasmuch as the means of inspection and enforcement would overlap considerably
and would gain strength through coordination.
But won’t the abolition of nuclear weapons undo one of the very building blocks
of peace that I have named? If the ever-present danger of nuclear annihilation has
paralyzed great-power war, won’t great-power war spring to life once nuclear weapons are removed from the picture? The answer to the question lies at the root of the
nuclear predicament. It is a profound misunderstanding of the nuclear age to suppose that its basic features emanate from nuclear hardware. They do not. They emanate, as we have seen, from the knowledge that underlies the hardware. The number
of nuclear warheads in the world can fall and the number of fingers on the nuclear
button can decrease, even to zero, without subtracting a single digit from the physical equations on which the bomb is based.
It is the spread of this knowledge throughout the world that guarantees that the
war system can never operate on a global basis as it did before. The persistence of
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the knowledge — the inherent capacity to rebuild nuclear arsenals, or to produce
other weapons of mass destruction — will stand in the way. Let us imagine that
nuclear weapons have been abolished by treaty, and that a nation then violates it by,
secretly or openly, building a nuclear arsenal and threatening to use it to bully the
world. As soon as the threat has been made, scores of other nations, all nuclear —
capable, would be free to build and threaten to use their own nuclear arsenals in
response, in effect deterring the violator. Not global hot war but a reflation of cold
war would be the result. A crude system of mutual assured destruction would be
reestablished, and wider war would be deterred, just as it is in our world of large
nuclear arsenals. The important point, as always in matters of deterrence, is not that
this would necessarily be done (although the scenario has a credibility that many
existing ones lack) but that any government would know in advance that such a
response was available, and would have every reason to desist from reckless schemes
in the first place. The threat would not constitute nuclear deterrence in the classic
sense of threatening instant nuclear retaliation; yet it would still be a kind of deterrence.
Abolition, when seen in this cold light, cannot mean a return to the pre-nuclear
age, whether one might wish for such a development or not, nor can it rule out once
and for all a resurgence of nuclear armaments in some future dark age, whose coming no one can preclude. It does, however, mean that a return to the global adapt-ordie war system is impossible. Abolition, in view of these circumstances, which as far
as we know are unchangeable, would be nothing more-or less-than an indispensable
though insufficient recognition by the human species of the terrible, mortal predicament it has got itself into, and a concrete expression of its resolve to find a solution.
Abolition should not be undersold but it should not be oversold either.
There is thus more continuity between a policy of nuclear abolition and nuclear
deterrence than at first meets the eye. It is as if we were saying, Let us take the deterrence theorists at their word that the goal of deterrence has been to prevent war.
Unfortunately, we have to note an obvious fact: if you seek to avoid doing something by threatening to do that same thing, you have, at least to some extent, undermined your own purpose. So let us begin to move to a policy in which the “not
using”— called by some “the tradition of nonuse”— gradually predominates, and
the “threatening to use” fades away. Abolition then would fulfill the promise that
deterrence now makes but cannot keep.
If this happened, the deterrence policy of the Cold War years might appear in
history in a more favorable light than is now likely. It might then be seen as a system that in effect extracted the violence of the war system of the twentieth century,
compacted it into a single world-destroying device, and shelved it — declaring to
all: “If you want to use violence, then you must use all of it, so be wise and use
none of it. And, just to make sure that you take us seriously, we are actually going to
build and deploy tens of thousands
of thermonuclear warheads and place them on rockets on hairtrigger alert.” If
followed by abolition, this act of extraction and consolidation would be revealed in
retrospect as having been a halfway house to the full transformation of the war system into a peace system.
In this sequence, nuclear deterrence replaces the war system with a threat-ofannihilation system; abolition then replaces the threat-of-annihilation system with a
peace system — or, at least, with the necessary foundation for a peace system. For
abolition would not in itself constitute anything like a full peace system;3 it would
only mark the world’s commitment to creating one. The alternative is that Cold War
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deterrence will prove to have been the training ground for the full nuclearization of
international affairs — that is, for nuclear anarchy.
Even after abolition, a critical decision remains to be made: whether or not to
continue to rely as a matter of policy on nuclear rearmament in the event that the
abolition treaty is violated. The nuts and bolts of any abolition agreement would be
highly detailed arrangements for suppressing certain technologies — all, of course,
inspected to the hilt. The agreement would specify exactly which nuclear-bomb
materials are permitted, in what quantities, and where. There will assuredly be an
enforcement provision in any such treaty, specifying what it is that the menaced
nations of the world are entitled or obliged to do in the event of the treaty’s violation. If nuclear rearmament is specified as a response, and technical arrangements
suitable for it are provided, then, to an extent, the world would still be relying on
nuclear terror to counter nuclear terror. Such provisions would embody what I have
called “weaponless deterrence” and the scholar Michael Mazarr has called “virtual
nuclear arsenals.” If, on the other hand, the treaty bans nuclear arms absolutely, and
forbids nuclear rearmament even in the face of its violation, whose remedy is to be
sought by other means, then the world would formally and finally have renounced
all dependence on nuclear terror for its safety.
The distinction between abolition, which is achievable, and a return to the prenuclear age, which is not, is necessary at the very least in order to understand and
appreciate the radical difference between Wilsonism, which proposed to replace war
with law, and abolition, which more modestly proposes merely to ratify the abolition of great-power war already imposed by the nuclear age, and to improve on
this situation by retiring nuclear terror, which never can be utterly purged from
human life, as deep into the background as is humanly possible. In practice, it may
well be that if abolition of the hardware takes place, this will be such a momentous
event morally, politically, and legally that, once some time has passed, and the world
has gained confidence in its new arrangement, the deeper renunciation of nuclear
terror will not be a difficult step. It would be deceptive, however, to suggest that a
world without nuclear arms would be a world without danger, or even without
nuclear danger. The risks, including the risk of nuclear rearmament, would be real.
It is, rather, by comparison with the nuclear anarchy or the vain attempts at imperial
domination that will otherwise probably be our future that the goal is attractive.
The dangers of abolition stem from potential violators of an abolition agreement.4
Two concerns have been uppermost — that the agreement could not be adequately
inspected and that it could not be adequately enforced. I will confine myself here to
a comment on each.
If historical experience is the test, possession of a nuclear monopoly (which a
nation would have if it violated an abolition agreement) is much less valuable than
nuclear theory predicts. At first glance, it appears that a country possessing a nuclear
monopoly would possess an insuperable advantage over any adversary; nucleardeterrence theory, which teaches that nuclear arsenals can be offset only by other
nuclear arsenals, takes this for granted. The matter has already been put to the test
several times in the history of the nuclear age, however, and in no case has possession of a nuclear monopoly translated into the foreseen military or political
Advantage — or, for that matter, into any detectable advantage at all. Nuclear
powers have repeatedly fought, and even lost, conventional wars against small, nonnuclear forces, without being able to extract any benefit from their “ultimate” weapons. In the Suez crisis of 1956, nuclear-armed Britain, allied with France and Israel,
failed to attain any of its aims against nonnuclear Egypt. France likewise found no
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utility in its nuclear monopoly in its war against the independence movement in
Algeria. Neither did the Americans in Vietnam, or the Soviet Union in its war in
Afghanistan, or Israel in its wars in Lebanon and in the West Bank, or China in the
border war it fought and lost with Vietnam in 1979. If the only examples were the
English, French, American, and Israeli ones, we might wonder whether democracies
are constrained from using nuclear bombs by scruples absent in totalitarian regimes.
The presence of the Soviet Union and China on the list, however, suggests that other
factors are at work. (It’s also worth recalling in this connection that the only country
ever to use nuclear weapons was a democracy, the United States.)
The question of just why none of these powers used nuclear weapons in these
losing wars is not easy to answer. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest a possible
reason. Isn’t it conceivable that heads of state are reluctant to use nuclear weapons
simply because they don’t want to kill millions of innocent people in cold blood at a
single stroke? This “self-deterrence” may be a more powerful force than theorists
have allowed. The moments in which the use of nuclear arms has in fact been seriously threatened have mostly been times when, as in the Cuban missile crisis, two
nuclear-armed adversaries were in collision. One-sided threats of use — after the
actual use on Hiroshima and Nagasak — are conspicuous by their rarity. If these
reflections have any foundation, then theory has libeled history, and the one clean
secret of the nuclear age may be a hidden minimal sanity or humanity in the heads
of state who have presided over nuclear arsenals.
However that may be, the relevance to the abolition question of this history is
that if six powers, both democratic and totalitarian, in possession of nuclear monopolies, lost six conventional or guerrilla wars against small forces without nuclear
arms, then we can hardly suppose that the entire family of nations, having recently
staked its security on a nuclear abolition treaty, would stand helpless before a single
miscreant regime that, having manufactured a concealed arsenal, stepped forward to
give orders to the world. Since a prospective cheater would know that other nations
would be fully capable of nuclear rearmament, violation of an abolition agreement
could never be a rational plan. Indeed, a policy of one nation bellowing nuclear
destruction to the whole world would be plain insanity. To this we can add that if it
were done anyway, the world would possess more than adequate means to respond.
It is unimaginable that a cowering world would knuckle under to the demands of the
cheater. Far more likely, it would react with determination to quell the threat or, at
the least, quickly reestablish a balance of terror.
The effectiveness of enforcement is linked to the effectiveness of verification.
Verification would include the right of peremptory, unannounced inspection of all
suspect facilities. One widely accepted conclusion among experts is that although the
discovery of secret facilities for the construction of new nuclear arsenals, which are
necessarily extensive, would be comparatively easy under a maximal regime of inspection, the discovery of caches of weapons hidden away before the agreement
came into effect — of “bombs in the basement” — would be difficult. Some experts
have even suggested that this problem is the fatal flaw in any plan of nuclear abolition. A nontechnical consideration, however, offers reassurance. Any nuclear arsenal,
even a hidden one, must not only be maintained and guarded by a large cadre but
also supervised by a military and political chain of command leading from the lowest technician up to the head of state. The United States’ expenditure of four and a
half billion dollars a year on “stockpile stewardship” shows that maintenance of a
nuclear arsenal is highly complicated, requiring many hands and minds. There must
also be delivery vehicles, plans for mating the warheads to the delivery vehicles,
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strategies, military and political, for using the weapons, and strategists to draw up
the plans. Moreover, changes of regime, whether by violent or peaceful means, will
multiply at a stroke the numbers of people privy to the secret. Many of those leaving
office, often unwillingly, may be ill-disposed toward those replacing them and inclined to tell what they know; or else the newcomers may disagree with their predecessors’ secret treaty violation and fear the wrath of the world. Few undertakings
have ever been more secret than the Manhattan Project, yet some of its most highly
classified information leaked in profusion to Stalin’s spies.
In sum, it is in the nature of things that, over time, a growing body of people will
share the secret of a hidden arsenal, and any one of them can reveal its existence to
the world. With every year that passes, this body will grow. As in proliferation, the
irresistible tendency of knowledge to spread shows itself — in this case to the advantage of disarmament. Time is the friend of inspection and thus of an abolition
agreement. In the long run, the secret of a hidden arsenal would be as hard to keep
as the secret of the bomb itself.
Like a nuclear monopoly, the bomb in the basement looks much more dangerous
in theory than in the context of politics and history. In both circumstances, the natural repugnance that human beings have for nuclear weapons may have real-world
consequences unforeseen in the denatured calculations of nuclear strategists — in the
first case, inspiring among statesmen who wield monopolies an unexpected reluctance even to consider using their supposed advantage, in the second inspiring
whistle-blowers to reveal activities that, under the terms of an abolition agreement,
would be named and understood by all to be crimes against humanity.
All-or-Nothing Again?
Haven’t I, though, simply reintroduced the fatal, all-or-nothing Wilsonian dilemma
by insisting on the abolition of nuclear weapons rather than, say, their reduction to
lower levels, or their reconfiguration in a more stable mode? Could it be that, by
demanding abolition, we would be condemning ourselves to the same collapse of an
overambitious plan that Wilson suffered? Admittedly, the proposal is ambitious. Yet
nuclear abolitionism differs from Wilsonism in critical respects. The war system of
Wilson’s time was a workable and working machine, tightly integrated into the decision making of global politics, and so able to serve as the “pursuit of politics by
other means.” This cannot be said of the system c nuclear deterrence that supplanted
it. After Nagasaki, no one h; figured out how to gain political advantage from using,
or even fro possessing, nuclear weapons. The nuclear system is far more dangerous
and far less useful than the war system was. As such, should be much easier to clear
out of the way.
Another difference is that nuclear arsenals, unlike the old w. system, can be
eliminated step by step. The first steps have in fact already been taken through arms
control agreements. It is tf unequivocal commitment to the goal, accompanied by
unmistakable steps to achieve it, and not the rapidity of its achievement that is most
important. To be more precise, the period of implementation must be short enough
to persuade potential nuclear proliferators that to build a new arsenal would be a
worthless an dangerous expense, while being long enough to inspire confidence
among the nuclear powers that inspection and enforcement are adequate.
Not withstanding the absolutist ring of the word, abolition : not “all,” even in the
context of the nuclear predicament. Thanks to the indelible character of nuclear
scientific know-how, the “all in this matter, however ardently we might desire it, has
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been move beyond our reach forever. All we can do in the circumstance is set ourselves against the evil day with the full force of our concerted political will.
It’s in the context of a cooperative approach to nuclear nonproliferation that the
logic of a cooperative approach to terrorism, nuclear or otherwise, is best understood. Like war, terrorism must now be divided into two categories. Just as we distinguish between conventional war and unconventional war (meaning war with
weapons of mass destruction), so we must distinguish between conventional terrorism, using ordinary explosives, and unconventional terrorism, using weapons of
mass destruction. Unconventional terrorism — the problem of the small group that
wields immense destructive power because it has got hold of one of these weapons
— can be addressed only by gaining control over the technology involved. After all,
not even the most successful war on terrorism imaginable can reduce the population
of terrorists to zero. The rigorous global inspection system of an abolition agreement would be the ideal instrument to choke at its source the danger that terrorists
will acquire weapons of mass destruction. Even if such a system were in place, it
must be admitted, the problem would not be completely solved. It might still be
possible for a group to clandestinely create the needed technology. But the problem
might be 98 percent solved, which is perhaps the most that can be hoped for. At each
step along the path, the danger of diversion or construction of weapons of mass
destruction would decline.
The hope of combating stateless global terrorism of the kind represented by the
A1 Qaeda network (which must be distinguished from the innumerable local varieties of terrorism around the world) likewise appears destined for disappointment
without the creation of cooperative international structures involving the great majority of nations. A global threat requires a global response, and a global response
will be possible only if governments work together rather than against one another.
Historically, the greatest successes in reducing terrorism have been accomplished by
a combination of police action and political attention to underlying causes. There is
no reason to suppose that a global version of the largely national efforts would be
different.
It is difficult to imagine the United States, acting alone together with just a few
nations, will be able to coerce or overthrow every regime that “supports” terrorism
or, for that matt defeat or destroy every proliferator of weapons of mass destruction.
The cooperation of governments, not their antagonism, is t indispensable precondition for a successful policy of opposing a] reducing global terrorism of any kind. A
cooperative policy alone likewise avoids the danger, posed by the imperial approach,
that hostile action, in the Middle East or elsewhere, will widen the pool of recruits
for terrorist groups. At the same time, it is the likeliest basis for the political efforts
that, over the long run, are the on lasting solution to terrorist threats.
Delaminating Sovereignty
Sovereignty, the conceptual crystallization of the all-or-nothing trap, is, as its first
intellectual exegete Jean Bodin knew so well bundle of powers forced together under
the pressure of military necessity or ambition. That was why at the birth of the concept sovereignty its two inseparable defining principles were complete reliance upon
the sword and indivisibility. That, too, was why, the later, popular incarnations of
sovereignty, the people, their territory, and the land had to be congruent, excluding
all overlaps mixed national populations, collective rights, or divided authorities. Yet
long experience with popular government, in the United States and elsewhere, has
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revealed that when power is cooperative, rather than coercive — based on action
willingly concerted rather than compelled — then, in the domestic sphere, at least, it
does not have to be indivisible. It can be federated; it can be divided among
branches of government and localities; it can be delaminated.
It was not clear, on the other hand, whether such division could occur in the international sphere. Certainly, division was out of the question as long as the global
adapt-or-die war machine subjected nations to its crushing pressure. However, now
that that machine has been paralyzed and the pressure lifted, we can ask the question
again. And in fact there are already signs of change. In regions in which coercive
power, sovereign and indivisible, has yielded, structures of cooperative power, limited and divisible, have flourished. The most striking example is the European
Union. Let us recall that sovereignty was first asserted in Europe by absolutist kings
as a scythe to cut down the tangled thickets of medieval political institutions, with
their dense, overlapping webs of ecclesiastical as well as secular rights, privileges,
and duties. Although sovereignty is now defended as the guarantor of the plurality
of states, originally it was diversity’s enemy. It was the instrument of a radical simplification of politics, reducing the array of political actors to subjects on the one
side and a sovereign on the other. The development of the European Union, however, shows that democratic states at peace with one another are now free to create a
rich variety of hybrid arrangements, most of them unimaginable under the terms of
the choice between a Wilsonian global constitution and the old war system. The
E.U., as the former chancellor of Germany Helmut Schmidt has commented, “marks
the first time in the history of mankind that nation-states that differ so much from
each other nevertheless ... have voluntarily decided to throw in their lot together.”
The result has not been a simplification of politics. The union’s economic and political institutions, which inch forward year by year, are already characterized by a
complexity not far from the medieval. They defy analysis on the basis of such
simple, clear principles of the recent past as sovereignty, whether of the people, the
state, or anyone else.
Formulas for shared or limited sovereignty are also a necessary part of any
solution to most wars of national self-determination, in so many of which the
requirement of one state for one people on one territory has proved to be a recipe
for nightmare. The most ingenious and promising solution is the on-and-off Good
Friday accord of 1998, which may one day lead to a resolution of the conflict in
Northern Ireland. In the European Union, the absence of conflict made structures of
divided power possible; in Ireland, divided structures of power are being used to try
to end a conflict — a more difficult challenge.
The Irish conflict, although possessing many singular local and historical features, nevertheless arose out of a dilemma of a kind shared by many other wars of
national self-determination. Two neighboring peoples (in this case, the Irish and the
English) have a long history of conflict (in this case going back at least four centuries). Between them is a disputed territory, on which their peoples are intermixed.
(Northern Ireland, which remained under British rule after Irish independence in
1922, contains a narrow Protestant majority dedicated to preserving the union with
Britian and a large Catholic minority of “nationalists” eager to join the Irish Free
State.) Similar elements can be found in lands as diverse as Sri Lanka, Kashmir,
Crete, Rwanda, several of the former Soviet republics, almost all the former Yugoslavian nations, and Palestine.
The two communities in Northern Ireland appeal to common principles — the
right of self-determination and majority rule. The problem is that each has drawn
294

the boundaries of the “self” that is to be “determined” differently. The Protestant
unionists draw a line that encompasses Great Britain, then crosses the Irish Sea and
runs around the borders of Northern Ireland. Within that circle, which describes an
existing institutional reality, the majority is British and Protestant. The Catholic
nationalists wish to draw a line that simply circumscribes the Irish island (including,
of course, Northern Ireland). Within that circle, representing the dream of a unified
Ireland, the majority would be Irish and Catholic. The two circles overlap in Northern Ireland. If the first circle5 is accepted as “the nation,” then majority rule for now
dictates that Northern
Ireland will remain part of Great Britain; if the second circle is accepted, then
Northern Ireland would join Ireland. The problem is the one that lies at the heart of
the separation question: Which groups have the right to form themselves into a body
politic, in which a vote of the majority binds the minority? This is the question to
which liberal democratic thought, from the time of the American Revolution down
to our day, has been unable to offer any answer. Indeed, two of its elementary principles, self-determination and majority rule, seem to be part of the problem. An
answer can be found only by dividing the supposedly indivisible — by disaggregating the powers fused in national sovereignty. That is what the Good Friday accord
does.
The immediate problem was the savage internecine warfare that broke out between nationalist and unionist extremists in Northern Ireland. The path to a solution
could not be found in Northern Ireland alone. It lay, as John Hume, the leader of the
nationalist Social Democratic and Labour Party, came to understand, also in London, Dublin, Brussels (home of the European Parliament), and even in Washington,
where President Bill Clinton played a mediating role. First, the two outside state
parties, the United Kingdom and the Irish Republic, had to surrender any claim to a
right of sovereignty over Northern Ireland. The Irish Republic did so by amending
its constitution, which had claimed sovereignty over the whole island. Great Britain,
to which Northern Ireland now belonged, renounced any “selfish, economic” interest
in the territory. That is, if Northern Ireland itself wanted to leave the United Kingdom, Great Britain would let it.
The remaining question was how, if the two outside claimants were ready to surrender their claim, the future national status of Northern Ireland was to be determined. The accord’s answer was “the principle of consent”: the people of Northern
Ireland would decide their own future by democratic procedures. In the language of
the accord, “It is hereby declared that Northern Ireland in its
entirety remains part of the United Kingdom,” unless, “voting in a poll,” it decides to “form part of a united Ireland.”
These provisions ended the tug-of-war between the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Ireland for control over Northern Ireland but left intact the tug-of-war
— the sanguinary terrorist conflict — between extremists in the two local communities, each longing for union with a different country. The Protestants, still in the
majority (though a dwindling one, as the Catholic population is growing faster than
the Protestant), would opt for continued union with the United Kingdom, and also
might continue to use their majority power to abuse and repress the Catholic minority. Inasmuch as such repression had been a primary cause of the conflict in the first
place, it could hardly be taken lightly.
The accord addressed that problem with several further provisions, among them a
plan to include a due proportion of nationalists in the Northern Ireland police force
and a plan for political power sharing between the two communities. One important
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feature of the latter was an agreement to apportion ministers of the government of
Northern Ireland in accord with party strength in the assembly, rather than adopting
a winner-take-all arrangement. This provision was a dramatic grant of exactly the
sort of collective minority rights that classical liberal democratic theory was unable
to approve. It ordained something that has always been a bete noire of classical liberalism — ”concurrent majorities,” in which overlapping communities each vote
separately for their representatives, who then must share power. In the first government under the accord, half of the ministries went to the minority nationalists.
Still another provision established a North/South Ministerial Council to make
decisions on matters of mutual concern, such as agriculture, inland waterways, trade,
and tourism. Created by legislation passed both in the British Parliament and in the
Irish Republic’s Oireachtas, the council includes the Irish Taoiseach and First Minister of Northern Ireland as well as other ministers, and is to arrive at decisions “by
agreement of the two sides.” A Council of the Isles was also created to deal with
matters involving all of Ireland and Britain.
The parties to the Good Friday accord did not set out to dismantle sovereignty,
yet that is what the accord does. We will look in vain in this agreement for power
that can be called sovereign. The people of Northern Ireland remain citizens of the
United Kingdom, yet they have been granted a constitutional right that the citizens
of few, if any, other nation-states enjoy — the right to remove themselves and their
land and goods to another country upon a majority vote. (It is a right that the Muslims of Kashmir, the Tamils of Sri Lanka, and the Tibetans in China, to give three
of many possible examples, would love to acquire.) They have a clear right to remain British but no obligation to do so. Such a right is, indeed, perhaps the most
elementary collective right a people can possess, the right of self-determination,
which is the essence of national sovereignty. And yet in Northern Ireland this right,
which is in truth a power, is obviously conditioned and limited. It was created by
decisions in the United Kingdom, and can be suspended by the United Kingdom,
which can restore direct rule over Northern Ireland, as it has done several times in
the past three decades. (However, if the people of Northern Ireland once were to
exercise their right to join the Irish Republic, England’s power to suspend the government would be at an end.) And although it permits the people of Ulster to define
themselves politically by a vote, their options are limited. They are not permitted,
for example, to establish themselves as an independent state.
As for the Irish Republic, it explicitly renounced its demand for sovereignty over
Northern Ireland, yet thereby gained, through the Ministerial Council, more actual
influence over the North than ever before. This arrangement has left traditional
notions of sovereignty in the dust, clearing the path, as the peoples involved may
decide, for all kinds of incremental, mixed institutions and arrangements for shared
power that would be far richer and more nuanced than the bare choice between
union with Great Britain and union with the Irish Republic. All the while, the Irish
Republic can expect a day when Northern Ireland may of its own volition switch
allegiance from the United Kingdom to Ireland by a mere majority vote.
At the same time that the United Kingdom was entering into this agreement, it
was devolving new powers upon Scotland and Wales, in the most radical constitutional reforms in Britain of the twentieth century. When we consider that both innovations were occurring within the context of the steadily evolving constitutional
arrangements of the European Union, we arrive at a picture of fundamental political
transformation at every level of European politics, and grasp that national
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sovereignty is now in the process of giving way to new forms in the very Europe in
which the concept was born.
The influence of the Good Friday accord, if it succeeds, may extend far beyond
Europe. It would be the first peaceful settlement since the end of the Cold War of a
war of national selfdetermination — the first squaring of the circle. The Irish protagonists admittedly enjoy advantages that the parties in other wars of national selfdetermination lack. Probably the most important is that all the governments involved
— the Irish Republic’s, the British, and Northern Ireland’s operate according to
democratic principles. Alternatives to the gun — elections, parliamentary debates,
free discussion — have always been available for use and have been used. For example, a gradual shift of the Irish Republican Army from violent struggle to electoral struggle has been one of the keys to progress brought by the agreement. In
addition, the two governments in the dispute were willing to renounce their claims
in favor of a decision by the people of the territory.
Such a combination of advantages is unavailable in almost any of the world’s
other many wars of national self-determination, in most of which either one or both
of the warring parties is authoritarian or is unyielding in its territorial claim. (For
example, India, though a democracy, has never been willing to let the people of
Kashmir decide their future in a vote.) Nor would a success in Ireland have much
value as a model in the lands of failed states, where the problems are more likely to
be extreme poverty, lack of civil institutions, and underdevelopment than to be the
excessive, murderous strength of political factions. There are parts of the world
where neither violent nor nonviolent solutions offer ready answers, where patience is
the better part of wisdom, and amelioration of the worst evils, such as famines, or
merely heading off further catastrophic deterioration of a situation, may be the best
that outside intervention can provide for the calculable future.
Nevertheless, the value of a successful Good Friday accord as a precedent for
resolving wars of self-determination could be real, and the idea of delaminating
sovereignty has already been proposed as a component of the settlement of other
conflicts. In Sri Lanka, any solution to the conflict between the Tamil Tigers, who
have been seeking an independent state in the north of the island, and the government that represents the Sinhalese majority will undoubtedly require some kind of
power sharing. Some analysts have proposed that if the Israelis and the Palestinians
ever return to a peace process, they may want to provide for dual sovereignty over
the holy sites of Jerusalem, where not only national populations but religious buildings of high symbolic importance to several faiths are under contention. The Wailing Wall forms one side of a hill on which the Temple, the Jews’ most holy site,
once stood but on which the A1 Aksa mosque, Islam’s second-most holy site, now
stands. One might suspect that a mischievous God, by permitting this interpenetration of holy objects, had decided to create, in the medium of architecture, a tangible
symbol of the riddle of wars of national self-determination. The question He thus
put before us was: How, when you cannot physically separate peoples (or their sacred buildings), can you organize the political world so that each people can be true
to its deepest beliefs while living in peace with others? The tangible quandary of the
holy sites poses an intangible riddle, which, in the words of the Israeli writer Avishai
Margolit, is “How does one divide a symbol?” Precisely because a clash of faiths is
involved in Jerusalem, which is a holy land for three religions, a settlement there
one day would transcend the Good Friday accord in symbolic meaning.
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Delaminating Self-Determination
The possibility of addressing wars of self-determination by delaminating sovereignty
could open wider horizons of international reform. The scholar of international law
Gidon Gottlieb, for example, has outlined a provocative legal program of surgery
upon sovereignty. It would be foolish, he recognizes, to suppose that theoretical
breakthroughs can solve real conflicts with long histories. “How ‘relevant’ are mere
ideas and concepts,”6 Gottlieb asks, “when much blood has been shed and where
enemies are locked in mortal combat? . . . The setting for peacemaking in ethnic
wars is both grim and discouraging. Political efforts are invariably situated in the
context of long and complex local histories of strife, of grievances, and of crimes
well remembered. Layers upon layers of promises ignored, broken pledges, and
treaties violated form the usual background to new promises, new pledges, and new
treaties offered.”
Yet new ideas have a role to play when they are based on new realities in the
situations in question. Gottlieb proposes that the two basic components of sovereignty, the nation and the state, might in some circumstances be separated. The
problem of mixed populations, he has suggested, might be easier to solve if the
international community created, alongside states but separate from them, a juridical
status for nations. The individual person would then have available two internationally recognized statuses — one as a citizen of a state, the other as a member of a
nation. In this “deconstruction” of sovereignty, the old unity of state, people, and
territory would be dissolved. Each of the two statuses would confer rights and privileges but not the same ones. State rights, for instance, might include all the classical
rights of individual liberty, while national rights might include such collective rights
as the right to speak one’s own language, to control local schools, or to practice
one’s faith. Special passports to travel between the states that are hosts to one nation
might be granted. One nation then could overlap many states, and vice versa.
Among other examples, Gottlieb cites the dilemma of the Kurdish people, now
living under the sovereignty of Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria, in all of which they
are more or less embattled. The classic solution to the dilemma, establishment of a
sovereign Kurdish state according to the traditional rules of self-determination,
would solve the problem for the Kurds but at the certain cost of bloody upheaval in
four states and the possible creation of the reverse problem of repression of Turks,
Iraqis, Iranians, and Syrians within newly drawn Kurdish borders. Instead of heading down this road, something that seems exceedingly unlikely to happen in any
case, Gottlieb proposes conferring his formal national status upon the Kurds, guaranteeing them certain cultural and other rights and privileges within the framework
of each of the four states. He proposes similar solutions for the struggles of national
self-determination in Cyprus, in Canada (over the status of Quebec), and in Armenia
and Azerbaijan (over the contested NagornoKarabak and Nakhichevan enclaves).
Delaminating sovereignty entails delaminating self-determination, at least as this
has traditionally been conceived. Self-determination, one might say, must yield to
self-determinations and selves — determination — that is, to permission for more
than one nation to find expression within the border of a single state and to permission for individuals and groups to claim multiple identities — for example, Kurdish
and Turkish. As the story of American independence demonstrates, the connection
between the concepts of sovereignty and self-determination, otherwise called
independence, has been close. Reasoning about the nature of sovereignty compelled
the colonists to conclude that the choice they faced belonged in the all-or-nothing
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category — either full independence or full subordination to Britain. It could not be
otherwise in an age when sovereignty was regarded as the prime attribute of a body
politic.
Yet even during the age of the colonial empires, some of the best minds cast sidelong glances at middle courses between empire and independence. We have already
mentioned the plan that called for replacement of the British Empire by “an association of states endowed with British liberties, and owing allegiance directly to the
sovereign head.” Similar in character was the “Galloway plan,” for a “colonial union
under British Authority which included a legislative council made up of representatives from the colonial assemblies and a president general to be appointed by the
king.” For such plans to have succeeded, either the empire would have had to transform itself into a body based on consent, which is to say into a true federation, or
the colony would have had to bow to force. Burke, one of the few Englishmen of
his time ready to apply English principles of liberty and consent to the empire as a
whole, was also one of the first to glimpse the full difficulty of the task, even in
purely intellectual terms. “There is not a more difficult subject for the understanding
of men,”7 he commented in words that have held true down to this day, “than to
govern a large Empire upon a plan of Freedom.”
The difficult subject would arise many more times in the history of modern empires. The French-Algerian crisis of the 1960s inspired the novelist and thinker
Albert Camus to tackle another incarnation of it. France had settled a large colony
of its citizens — the pieds-noirs in Algeria, whose native population began, in the
1950s, to agitate for independence. Camus, himself a pied-noir, devised a confederal
plan, in which the fundamental character of the French state would change to incorporate Algeria. An Algerian regional assembly representing Algerian citizens and
dealing with Algerian problems would be established under a unicameral federal
Senate, which would preside over a Commonwealth consisting of France and Algeria, and elect a confederal government. It would mean, Camus explained, the end of
the single nation-state born in 1789, and “the birth of a French federal structure”
that would create a “true French Commonwealth.” Camus understood, as Burke did,
what a profound reconception of the state, called une et indivisible in the French
Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, would be entailed in such a plan
for a multinational state. “Contrary above all to the deep-rooted prejudices of the
French Revolution, we should thus have sanctioned within the Republic two equal
but distinct categories of citizens,” Camus wrote. “From one point of view, this
would mark a sort of revolution against the regime of centralization and abstract
individualism resulting from 1789, which, in so many ways, now deserves to be
called the Ancien Regime.” Of particular note in our context is Camus’s hope that
the new structure might show the way for “the European institutions of the future.”
As Jeffrey C. Isaac, a scholar of Camus and of Hannah Arendt, has pointed out,
Arendt had been prompted to think along similar lines in the late 1940s in regard to
the establishment of Israel. The problem, once again, was two nations — Palestinian
and Jewish — on one soil. She, too, believed that the only peaceful solution to
dilemmas of this kind was a confederal one. The alternative was imposition of
Israeli rule on Arabs and Arab territory by force. “The ‘victorious’ Jews,” she wrote,
“would live surrounded by an entirely Arab population, secluded inside ever-threatened borders, absorbed with physical defense to a degree that would submerge all
other interests and activities.”8 The accuracy of this prediction does not mean that
Arendt’s solutions were feasible. (The fact that one solution fails doesn’t mean the
alternative would have worked.)
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What is certain is that the hour of the consensual multinational state had no more
come in the Middle East in the late 1940s than it had come in England in the 1770s
or France in the 1960s. Indivisible national sovereignty remained the rule, and force
remained its guiding principle. Not until our day has that hopeful hour perhaps
arrived for one or two regions of the world.
Enforcement
In a program whose overall object is to wean politics from its reliance on force, the
question of enforcement is obviously vexatious. It’s clear, however, that if the
international community should ever embark on such a program, enforcement will
be a necessary element. The question is what its scope, provenance, and limitations
should be. At one extreme is the American imperial plan, which is almost all enforcement — the unilateral right of a single power to attack and overthrow other
governments at will. At the other extreme is no enforcement. Somewhere in between
is a vision of an international community that fundamentally relies on consent and
the cooperative power consent creates, but nevertheless reserves the right to resort to
force in certain well-defined, limited circumstances. A nuclear-abolition agreement,
for example, would require enforcement in the event of a violation, as would a coordinated international effort to combat global terrorism. Ideally, force would play
the restricted policing role it does in a democratic state. I say “ideally,” because if an
international police force is to be legitimate there must exist an international order
whose legitimacy is generally recognized, and this is just what is largely missing in
the world today.
In these circumstances — which not even the implementation of every proposal
in this book would fundamentally alter, since they do not envision a world state,
legitimate or otherwise — there could hardly be a police force acting in the name of
such a body to enforce its laws. Yet, as we tackle this question, the advantage of our
circumstances over Wilson’s are again evident. Because of the war system’s demise,
we are not in any way required to establish an overwhelming international military
force that could impose its will on all miscreants. For excellent reasons, this idea no
longer even crosses most people’s minds; the only plan remotely like it is the current
fantasy of hegemony that tempts American policy makers. And so we are free in the
area of enforcement, too, to proceed incrementally. To whatever extent the international community decides to exist — and no further — it can seek to enforce a few
selected internationally agreed — upon principles. Such an approach, it is true,
would not end war at one stroke, as the League of Nations was supposed to do, but
it would close the all-too-familiar demoralizing gap between grandiose rhetoric and
trifling deeds — a perennial consequence of the bad faith of good intentions that
was the curse of attempts at international peacemaking in the twentieth century.
The immediate need is for a principle defining a task that is achievable, or may
soon be achievable, by the international community. One such principle has already
been identified: the obligation to prevent and punish crimes against humanity. The
concept of crimes against humanity first gained currency at the trials at Nuremberg
in 1945, in which the victors of the Second World War held Nazi leaders accountable for the atrocities of their regime. Recently, it has been applied again in legal
proceedings in special international tribunals against the former president of Yugoslavia Slobodan Milosevic and against the perpetrators of genocide against the Tutsis
in Rwanda. The newly constituted International Criminal Court (I.C.C.), making use
of the language of the Nuremberg Charter, has defined crimes against humanity as
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acts, including murder, torture, rape, forced disappearance, and persecution, when
committed “as part of a widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian
population . . .” The key distinction therefore is between abuses of individuals,
which are not crimes against humanity per se, and abuses that occur as part of an
assault against a defined group, whether ethnic, religious, racial, or national.
The most historically important of the crimes against humanity-specifically outlawed by the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, of 1948 — is genocide, which may be roughly defined as an assault upon the
life of one of the earth’s peoples. There has been debate over whether the definition
should include only ethnic, national, and racial groups or social classes and political
groups, too. If the more expansive definition is accepted, then the definition of
genocide will be hard to distinguish from the I.C.C.’s definition of crimes against
humanity, and the two concepts would merge.
Why groups, however? Why should the international community concern itself
especially with collectivities rather than individuals as such? An obvious pragmatic
reason is that if the international community accepted responsibility for enforcing
individual human rights, it would in effect have to constitute itself as a world state.
The justifications for collective international intervention would be unlimited, since
there is no country on earth in which some human-rights abuses do not occur. There
is also a legal reason. All positive law is the law of a community. Whereas each
national community is a community of individuals, the international community has,
so far, been mainly a community of states, whose sovereignty has been guaranteed
by international law (including the UN Charter). It therefore makes sense that international law would be especially concerned with states and peoples. When one person kills another, the order of the national community is violated. When a state kills
a people, the order of the international community is violated.
Laws mandating international action to set aside sovereignty in the name of stopping crimes against humanity would revise this understanding without throwing it
out. The state would still be recognized as the prime international actor, but it would
no longer necessarily be recognized in every case as the nation’s legitimate representative. The international community (although not any single power) would assert a
sharply limited and exceptional right to judge the fitness of a state to represent its
people. Such a recognition would form a natural complement to the revisions of
sovereignty needed to settle the wars of national self-determination. In most cases
the claims of states, even of repressive states, to represent a nation would be recognized. But when a state perpetrated crimes against humanity upon its own population, it would forfeit its claim to represent them and open itself to international
intervention. The right of states to rule in their own territories would cease to be
absolute; rather, it would be like a license, valid in almost all circumstances but
revocable in limited and extreme cases, to be defined by stringent and well-known
principles.
In this shift, the rights of states would not be eliminated in favor of the rights of
individuals, thereby opening the floodgates of unlimited intervention; rather, the
rights of states would partially yield to the rights of nations — that is, of peoples —
whose right of self-determination would remain untouched, and might at times be
supported by intervention from without. When Slobodan Milosevic sought to forestall intervention against his genocidal campaign in Kosovo, he invoked sovereignty.
In response, the international community could only argue circuitously that his
crimes within his own borders were a “threat to peace.” A simpler and stronger answer would have been, “In what sense can you call yourself the sovereign represen301
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tative of a people that you are seeking to destroy? Your genocide nullifies your sovereignty.”
Stopping crimes against humanity would be a new vocation for the international
community, which has generally looked the other way when such crimes have
occurred. Not until very recent times has the concept of collective rights made headway. An enforced prohibition of genocide, based on the conviction that the international community can no more tolerate the murder of one of its peoples than
national communities can tolerate the murder of a person, would meet this welcome
trend coming the other way. It would be a sheet anchor for the collective rights of
peoples. (It is obvious, however, that enforcement even of this limited principle
faces large obstacles. It is one thing, for example, to bring the former leader of a
small, weak state, such as Serbia, to book for his crimes. It would be quite another
to do the same to the leader of a large powerful state, such as Russia or the United
States.)
Once established, collective rights might, over the long run, take their place as
elements of a grand bargain, a new settlement of the rights, powers, and obligations
of the individual, states, nations, and the international community. In such a settlement, the rights of peoples would be increasingly protected by a coherent body of
law. Most important, peoples would possess the negative right not to be extinguished. They would possess in addition the positive right to self-determination.
This right, while recognized in law, would be guaranteed chiefly by each people’s
own powers of resistance — powers whose effectiveness were put on such stunning
display in the anti-imperial independence movements of the twentieth century —
and only secondarily by limited collective assistance from the international community. The right would be understood as belonging, in the last analysis, to nations
rather than to their governments. On the other hand, even when thus properly located, it would not be absolute — not be, that is, sovereign.
A commitment to stop crimes against humanity is a natural corollary to a program that demands nuclear abolition, fosters democracy, and delaminates sovereignty. The required shift in principle would look beyond states to peoples, in whom
the roots of political legitimacy would be acknowledged. The principle would also
apply to the nuclear threat, whereby not only every people but the human species as
a whole has been placed at risk of extinction. The doctrine of deterrence, which
“assures” the safety of one people from nuclear attack at the hands of another by
menacing both with annihilation, is — described without hyperbole — a policy of
retaliatory genocide. Adoption of this policy was the destination to which the great
powers, once they had failed to agree on the abolition of nuclear weapons in 1946,
were to a certain extent helplessly driven by the logic of the war system if which
they were entangled. Nevertheless, it is inescapable that carrying out genocide in the
event of nuclear attack is the heart o the policy. One of the deepest and most important consequence: of a prohibition of genocide would be a prohibition of the policy
of nuclear deterrence.
A Democratic League
Even as the main structures of coercive power are gradually being retired from use,
structures of cooperative power must gradually be built up. One of these would be
the foundation of a democratic league, designed to foster and build upon the peaceful proclivities already found in the core of the democratic process. It is true that the
power of democratic states to promote democracy outside their own borders is, by
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the nature of democracy, limited, States cannot create democracies; only peoples
can, through their actions and consent. (On the other hand, states are perfectly capable of creating dictatorships, which rule by force over unconsenting peoples.)
Nevertheless, democratic states can give assistance to one another or to peoples already seeking to found or preserve democracy. Such assistance would be strengthened by the foundation of an alliance made up of the democratic countries of the
world.
The idea first appears in history in the fourth century B.C., when the Athenian
statesman Arata, facing a threat to Greece from Philip of Macedon, who was making
common cause with autocratic Greek city-states, founded an alliance of the democratic city-states. Whereas Arata’s ultimate objective was to win a war, the purpose
today would be to preserve and strengthen democracy where it exists, to give it
support where it is struggling to come into existence, and, most important, to jointly
curb and correct the warlike and imperial tendencies that historically have accompanied the rise of this form of government and forestalled its potential contributions to
peace. Such was precisely the purpose of Kant’s proposal of a “peaceful union” of
republics, which would “gradually spread further and further by a series of alliances.”9
The main alliances in which the democracies now are involved present an anomalous picture. They are founded on every possible principle but democracy itself. The
Clinton administration participated in the establishment of a Community of Democracies devoted to some of these purposes, but, though it now counts 110 nations
among its members, it has yet to become a major forum for foreign policy decisions
or international policy NATO is an alliance made up entirely of democracies, but its
purpose is strictly military. The central obligation of the treaty — to come to the
defense of any member who is attacked — depends in no way on the character of
the regimes involved. In the absence of the Soviet Union, whose advance into the
center of Europe at the end of the Second World War prompted the alliance’s creation, the need even for this pledge of mutual assistance is unclear. The only war in
NATO’s history — the campaign to drive Serbian forces out of Kosovo — did not
involve an attack on a member.
The European Union is another alliance made up of democracies. (It was not
until 2001 that the Organization of American States adopted a “democratic charter.”)
Founded originally to foreclose a military danger — recurrence of war among the
nations of Europe — it has evolved over the decades into an organization in which
economic concerns predominate. Recently, the European nations have been asking
themselves what political and military functions the union might also assume. Although the union has led to many remarkable and hopeful political innovations,
including the European Parliament, the European Commission, and the European
Court of Human Rights, its boldest initiatives, culminating in the launch of the euro,
have so far been commercial. In consequence, when the time came for the West to
embrace the newborn democracies in Eastern Europe in the wake of the Soviet collapse, the chief consideration was not the strength of their commitment to democracy but the weakness of their economies. Blocked by this economic hurdle from
“joining Europe” — a phrase often used in the broad sense of joining the nowdemocratic system of the West through joining the E.U. — Poland, Hungary, and
the Czech Republic took the easier step of joining NATO. Had a democratic league
existed at the time, it would have provided all the Eastern European countries with a
way to “join Europe” that was appropriate to the new situation (the end of Soviet
rule and the foundation of democracy); that was possible (no economic hurdle
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would have stood in the way); and that was inoffensive to Russia. Not until 2002
was the decision to invite these countries into the E.U. finally made. A democratic
league would also serve to bind the Atlantic community by a tie that really should
continue to bind it; namely, a commitment to freedom. The military glue that binds
NATO is weakening in the absence of an enemy; and the economic glue of the E.U.,
although strong, tends in many areas to divide the Europeans from other democracies in the world. A democratic league, on the other hand, would possess a clear,
positive, common purpose that NATO lacks — adherence, irrespective of wealth or
geographic boundaries, to democracy.
The qualifications for joining the league would of course be observance of exacting standards of democratic governance and human rights. No state that failed to
meet the standards could join; any state that departed from them would be subject to
sanctions or expulsion. The league’s requirements would give expression to the
strong interest that every democratic country has in the preservation of democracy
elsewhere in the world. The democratic character of all the states involved would
also make supranational institutions among them far easier to establish than they are
at the United Nations, where dictatorships have equal voice with democracies in
votes on human rights. Juridical and legislative institutions of restricted scope could
be added to executive ones. The European Convention on Human Rights, which
established the European Court of Human Rights, and gives that court jurisdiction
over human-rights violations within member states, could be a model — as could
the European Parliament, whose members are directly elected, giving limited expression to an all — European public opinion.
The simplest and most obvious direct contribution that such a league could make
to international peace would be to pledge to resolve disputes among its members
without recourse to war, thus formalizing the historically demonstrated inclination
of democracies to remain at peace among themselves. A vow by democratic Finland
not to attack democratic India and vice versa would perhaps not be the end of history, yet the creation of a large body of nations in all parts of the earth that, both
formally and actually, had renounced war in their mutual relations would provide a
powerful example and, over time, perhaps a direction for the world as a whole.
Natural corollaries would be a commitment by the league to support the elimination of weapons of mass destruction, to steadily reduce the sale of conventional arms
to other countries, and to devote its resources to restraining or ending wars of selfdetermination wherever it could.
Far more important and difficult would be a commitment to checking the aggressive tendencies that, in modern as in ancient times, have constituted the brutal,
exploitive side of many democracies’ relations with the rest of the world. The most
serious and lasting contribution of a democratic league would be to choose
democracy over imperialism once and for all. In order to be worthy of the name, a
democratic league must be an anti-imperial league. Member nations would jointly
resolve not to create or support repressive regimes, not to use armed force merely to
advance commercial or other national interests, and in general to address international problems on a cooperative basis. A democratic league that sought to keep the
peace among its own members even as it fostered aggressive ambitions in the world
would destroy its own purpose.
Merely to state such goals, however, is once again to throw into distressing relief
the policies of the one democracy in the world that today threatens to make the fearful transition from republic to empire, the United States. It is hard to know which is
the greater tragedy — that, as the twenty-first century begins, the United States
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approaches the world with a drawn imperial sword, or that it discredits and disables
its rich and in many ways unique republican traditions, which, especially in their
treatment of sovereignty, offer many useful starting points for the new forms of
international cooperation, peacemaking, and peacekeeping that the world so badly
needs.
The Unconquerable World
Fifty-eight years after Hiroshima, the world has to decide whether to continue on
the path of cataclysmic violence charted in the twentieth century and now resumed
in the twenty-first or whether to embark on a new, cooperative political path. It is a
decision composed of innumerable smaller decisions guided by a common theme,
which is weaning politics off violence. Some of the needful decisions are already
clear; others will present themselves along the way. The steps just outlined are
among the most obvious.
I have chosen them not merely because their enactment would be desirable. They
represent an attempt to respond to the perils and dangers of this era as it really is, by
building on foundations that already exist. For even as nuclear arms and the other
weapons of mass destruction have already produced the bankruptcy of violence in its
own house, political events both earthshaking and minute have revealed the existence of a force that can substitute for violence throughout the political realm. The
cooperative power of now tightly woven, as I hope I have shown in these pages, into
the life of the world. It has already altered basic realities that everyone must work
with, including the nature of sovereignty, force, and political power. In the century
ahead it can be our bulwark and shield against the still unmastered peril of total
violence.
In our age of sustained democratic revolution, the power that governments inspire
through fear remains under constant challenge by the power that flows from
people’s freedom to act in behalf of their interests and beliefs. Whether one calls this
power cooperative power or something else, it has, with the steady widening and
deepening of the democratic spirit, over and over bent great powers to its will. Its
point of origin is the heart and mind of each ordinary person. It can flare up suddenly and mightily but gutter out with equal speed, unless it is channeled and controlled by acts of restraint. It is generated by social work as well as political activity.
In the absence of popular participation, it simply disappears. Its chief instrument is
direct action, both noncooperative and constructive, but it is also the wellspring of
the people’s will in democratic nations. It is not an all-purpose “means” with which
any “end” can be pursued. It cannot be “projected,” for its strength declines in proportion to its distance from its source; it is a local plant, rooted in home soil. It is
therefore mighty on the defensive, feeble on the offensive, and toxic to territorial
empires, all of which, in our time, have died. It stands in the way of any future
imperial scheme, American or other. This power can be spiritual in inspiration but
doesn’t have to be. Its watchwords are love and freedom, yet it is not just an ideal
but a real force in the world. In revolution it is decisive. Allied with violence, it
may accomplish immense things but then overthrow itself; tempered by restraint it
can burn indefinitely, like a lamp whose wick is trimmed, with a steady flame. Under the name of the will of the people it has dissolved the foundations first of monarchy and aristocracy and then of totalitarianism; as opinion, it has stood in judgment over democratically elected governments; as rebellious hearts and minds, it has
broken the strength of powers engaged in a superannuated imperialism; as love of
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country, it has fueled the universally successful movement for self-determination
but, gone awry, has fueled ethnic and national war and totalitarian rule, which soon
suffocate it, though only temporarily. It now must be brought to bear on the choice
between survival and annihilation. It is powerful because it sets people in motion,
and fixes before their eyes what they are ready to live and die for. It is dangerous
for the same reason. Whether combined with violence, as in people’s war, sustained
by a constitution, as in democracy, or standing alone, as in satyagraha or living in
truth, it is becoming the final arbiter of the public affairs of our time and the political bedrock of our unconquerable world. z
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